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Bilateral real exchange  rates are analyzed for fifteen countries over the 
period  1925-1937,  using  a  benchmark-invariant  principal  components 
technique. For the period 1925-1931, half of real exchange rate variation 
originates from countries on floating exchange rates, and half from price 
level differences between countries on the gold standard. For the period 
1931-1937,  real exchange rate movements between the sterling-bloc, the 
European  gold-bloc, and  the  US  and  Canada  appear dominant.  Within 
bloc variation is secondary and  mostly due  to competitive devaluations. 
Our  results  support  earlier  evidence  that  the  nominal  exchange  rate 
regime  to  a  large extent  determines  real  exchange  rate  variation. (JEL 
F31).  ©  1997  Elsevier Science Ltd. 
The level and variability of bilateral real exchange rates have been the subject 
of study for a long time. Important issues in this respect are the magnitude and 
persistence of real exchange rate deviations from equilibrium, the validity of 
relative purchasing power parity (PPP) in the short or long run I and the role of 
the real exchange rate in promoting external equilibrium. 
In this context, it has often been argued that the behavior of real exchange 
rates  depends  on  the  nominal  exchange  rate  regime  to  a  large  extent  (see 
Stockman  (1983),  and  Grilli  and  Kaminsky  (1991)  for  an  overview).  Fisher 
(1934)  already  notes  that  countries  on  the  same  monetary  standard  have 
similar price movements while countries not on the same monetary standard do 
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not. This suggests low real exchange rate variability among countries on fixed 
exchange rates.  In the same vein, Mussa (1986), for example, claims that the 
variance  of the  real  exchange  rates  of the  major industrialized countries  is 
eight  to  eighty times  higher during periods of floating exchange  rates  than 
during periods of fixed exchange rates.  For the interwar period, Eichengreen 
(1990)  shows for a  set  of nine countries that  on average real  exchange rate 
variability was highest in the interwar floating period (1922-1926),  and lowest 
under  the  gold-exchange  standard  (1927-1931),  with  the  managed  floating 
period (1932-1936) falling in between.  2 
One explanation for this phenomenon would be that under floating exchange 
rates  and  sticky  goods  prices,  nominal  exchange  rate  changes  are  almost 
one-to-one  reflected  in  real  exchange  rates,  while  under  fixed  nominal ex- 
change rates,  real  exchange  rates  could remain  relatively stable.  Arguments 
advanced by Eichengreen (1990, 1992)  and Nurkse (1944),  on the other hand, 
suggest  that  under  the  gold  exchange  standard  (1925-1931),  sizable  real 
exchange rate changes occurred too, because of large over- or undervaluations 
of  the  nominal  exchange  rate.  This  would  require  correspondingly strong 
domestic inflations or deflations. 
Grilli  and  Kaminsky (1991)  challenge  the  conventional wisdom that  real 
exchange rate variability depends on the nominal exchange rate regime. They 
cannot reject the hypothesis that dollar-pound real exchange rate movements 
across regimes in the interwar period come from a  common distribution and 
suggest  that  real  exchange  rate  variability  may  depend  on  specific  historic 
events, and, thus, is sample specific. 
In this paper, we intend to add to and improve on the existing evidence on 
interwar real exchange rate behavior. First, we apply a  principal components 
procedure to extract the dominant factors from a set of bilateral real exchange 
rates  between  15  currencies.  3 A  modification of  the  standard  procedure  is 
needed to  make  the  set  of extracted  principal components invariant  to  the 
arbitrary choice of benchmark currency. The major advantage of the technique 
is that it allows for a  simultaneous and symmetric analysis of all bilateral real 
exchange rates  in our data set.  In the literature,  a  more asymmetric view is 
taken in general, with exchange rates  being expressed in US dollars (or UK 
pounds)  only.  Second, we  explicitly  study  and  compare  the  gold-exchange 
period (1925-1931) and the managed floating period (1931-1937) to investigate 
the  influence  of  a  change  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  regime  on  real 
exchange rate patterns. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I  we derive the benchmark- 
invariant  principal  components transformation.  In  Section  II,  the  data  are 
described. In Section III, we present and discuss the  results of the principal 
components analysis for our data set of 15 countries over the periods May 1925 
to August 1931  (gold exchange standard),  and September 1931  to December 
1937 (managed floating). Section IV contains our conclusions. 
I. Methodology: principal components 
Principal  components analysis  4  is  a  powerful instrument  to  extract  (a  few) 
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dominant  factors  from  a  large  set  of  time  series.  However,  in  a  standard 
principal components analysis of real exchange rates the arbitrary choice of a 
benchmark currency affects the component structure. The correlation matrix of 
exchange rates vis-a-vis the dollar produces a different set of principal compo- 
nents  than  the  correlation  matrix of D-mark  exchange  rates,  although  they 
contain exactly the same amount of information. 
To cwercome this problem we require the set of principal components to be 
invariant with respect to the choice of benchmark currency. The cross sectional 
relations between exchange rates provide useful prior information to obtain a 
unique  scaling  of the  exchange  rate  data which will  ensure  such  invariance 
property in a natural and intuitive way. 
Consider  an  (n x  1)  multivariate  time  series  {xt}tv=l of logarithms  of real 
exchange rates expressed in a  common benchmark currency. Observations  on 
{x t} are stored in the (T x  n) data matrix X. The (T x  n) matrix Z  of principal 
components is a  transformation of the data matrix X, such that: 
1.  Z  = XQB, with Q  positive definite symmetric and  B  non-singular; 
2.  Z'Z  = A, with A  a  diagonal matrix with elements  A~ >_ A 2 >_ ... >_ A  n >  O; 
3.  B'QB = I, a normalization. 
Condition 1 shows that the transformation X  ~  Z  is linear.  Q  is an (n x  n) 
scaling  matrix  and  B  is  an  (n x  n)  matrix  containing  the  so-called  factor 
loadings. The second condition requires the components to be orthogonal. A  is 
an  (n x  n)  diagonal  matrix.  The  elements  of  A  are  in  descending order of 
magnitude and determine the variance of the principal components. The first 
principal component (the first column of Z) has the largest variance. Condition 
3 is a normalization to set the scale of Z. 
The transformation from  X  to  Z  is unique once Q  has been specified, i.e. 
there exists only one matrix  B  satisfying conditions 1, 2  and 3 s  (see Leamer 
1978,  Appendix A, theorem 35).  Given  Q,  the principal  components may be 
computed through solving the eigenvalue problem: 
(1)  ( QW2X'XQI /2)( QI /2B ) = ( Q1/2B ) A 
where Ql/2Q1/2 = Q. Equation (1)  shows how the components depend on the 
choice  of  the  scaling  matrix  Q1/2.  Q  is  not  determined  in  the  principal 
component analysis, but must be specified a priori by the user. 
In  many  principal  components  applications,  scale  dependence  problems 
exist.  If one of the variables has  a  much larger variance than the others, for 
instance because of having a different dimension, it will generally dominate the 
first principal component. For this reason, the analysis is mostly performed on 
normalized  variables.  In  that  case,  the  matrix  Q  is  chosen  diagonal  with 
elements  qii =  1/sii,  where sii  is  the sample variance of {xit}.  Then, the  only 
data input to the principal component analysis is the sample correlation matrix. 
The  issue  of  scale  dependency  plays  no  role  here,  however.  First,  all 
variables  in  our  data  set  have  the  same  dimension  of a  number  of foreign 
currency units per unit of some benchmark currency. Second, we have selected 
only countries without excessive inflation or exchange rate movements. We will 
213 Real exchange rates between the wars: C J M  Kool and K  G  Koedijk 
choose  Q  such  that  the  components  Z  are  invariant  to  a  change  in  the 
benchmark currency. 
To find a  suitable  matrix  Q, we first look at  the effect of a  change in  the 
benchmark currency. Let  x~j  be the logarithm of the (real) exchange rate of 
currency j  against  the  benchmark  currency  k.  Letting  currency  i  be  the 
benchmark instead of currency k  amounts to the linear transformation: 
(2)  xij =xkj -x~i,  for j  4= k; 
Xik  ~  --Xki. 
The transformation can be written compactly in matrix notation as 
(3)  X 1 =Px  0 , 
where P is the (n × n) matrix: 
<4,  ,=(  1  0  / 
-- gn-1  In-1 
in which ~ is a unity vector  6 (here of length n -  1), I  is the identity matrix, x ° 
is an (n x  1) vector of exchange rates in the original benchmark currency, and 
x I is the vector of exchange rates in the new benchmark currency (in this case 
currency). For notational  convenience we have  re-arranged the  order of ex- 
change rates such that currency became the new benchmark. Transformation 
to another benchmark currency, say currency k, entails a  permutation of the 
rows and columns of P. An important property of P  is  that  it  is  unipotent, 
meaning  that  p2 =L  Applying  the  same  transformation  twice  yields  the 
original exchange rates. 
Let  X i  and  X k  be  the  (T x  n)  matrices  of observations  on log exchange 
rates expressed in currency i  and k, respectively. A  change of the benchmark 
implies that  the data matrix  X i  is post-multiplied by P'  (after the necessary 
permutation of columns and rows in P', or of the columns in X i and X k). The 
principal components (Z) are invariant to this change of benchmark currency 
if: 
(5)  XiQB i = Z  = XkQBI,. 
Using the unipotent transformation matrix P  in (4}, we can write: 
(6)  XiQB~ =  Xk(  e'ae)en  i . 
A  comparison of equations  (5)  and (6)  shows that the principal components 
will be invariant to the change in the benchmark if we can construct Q  such 
that  Q = P'QP, and if the factor loadings are related by B k = PB~. Moreover, 
these  conditions  must  hold  for  all  possible  benchmark  currencies,  i.e.  all 
permutations of the transformation matrix P. Partitioning  Q-1  and expanding 
the condition Q = P'QP yields: 
(7)  Q-l=(  qu  q121  O'  [qtl  q12)-1-~' 
=  (  qll  qllt,,  __ q12  ) 
I qua_ q21  qU~,  _  q21t,  _  t, ql2  +  Q22  , 
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where qll  is a scalar, q12 and q21 are (n -  1) vectors, Q22 is a[(n -  1) ×  (n -  1)] 
matrix.  From equation  (7) we obtain the restrictions: 
(8)  q21  qll  =  --~-~,  and  q12 =_7_  ,qll , 
All non-diagonal  elements in the  first row and column of Q-~  must be equal 
and half the diagonal element. Since this must also hold if columns and rows 1 
and  j  (j =  2,...,n)  are  interchanged,  the  restrictions  in  (8)  must  hold  for  all 
columns and rows. Hence the matrix  Q-1  has the structure: 
(9)  Q-t  =  O(in + ~,,~,,,), 
where  0  is an arbitrary scalar. 7 The matrix inversion lemma then implies: 
(10)  Q =  I  n T- 1 L~'  =  [0-1/!(1  .  aL~')]  ?  =  (Ql/2) 2 
for s  ~ =  (1 -  (n + 1)-l/2)/n.  It  remains  to  be verified  that  B k = PB  i  relates 
the  new  factor  loadings  to  the  old  factor  loadings.  To  prove  this,  we  need 
condition 2  in the definition of the principal components.  The  factor loadings 
are uniquely determined by the requirement that the principal components are 
orthogonal with decreasing variances, which appear on the diagonal of the  A: 
(11)  A i =B'iQX'iXiQB  i =  (B'iP')(P'QP)(PX'iXiP')(P'QP)(PB i) 
=  (n,ie,  QI/2 )( Ol/2s,  k Xk QI/2 )( Q1/2pB i ). 
But  B k and  A k are also uniquely determined  in 
(12)  Ak=B'kQX'kXkQB~=(B'~Q'/2)(QI/2x'kXkQ'/2)(Q'/2Bk). 
Conditions (11) and (12) define the same eigenvalue problem, since (Q 1  / 2pB  i) 
and  Q~/2B~  are both required to be orthogonal matrices in condition 3 of the 
definition of the principal components. Therefore,  B~ = PBi, and  A k =  m i. This 
completes  the  proof that  there  exists  a  unique  set  of benchmark-invariant 
principal components. 
If all n  components are extracted from the original series the transformation 
is non-singular  and no information  in the data is lost. The proportion of total 
variation in the  data explained by the first  K  components is expressed by the 
goodness-of-fit statistic (see Anderson,  1984): 
K 
(13)  R2(K ) =  tr(Z(K)'Z(K))  _  ~=1 
Yl 
tr(Ql/2X'XQ1/2)  ~  A, 
i-I 
where  A  t >  A  2 >  ...> A  n  are  the  eigenvalues  of (QI/2X'XQ~/2),  and  Z(K)  is 
the (T × K) matrix of the first K  principal components of the transformed data 
XQl/2. 
For the  interpretation  of the  components our interest  is in  the  correlation 
between component  1  and  a  time  series  of real  exchange  rate  xij.  Since  the 
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principal  components are  orthogonal,  the  total  amount  of variation  in  xij 
explained by the first K  components is the sum of the squared correlations: 
K 
(14)  R21(K)  =  Y'.  ri~(l), 
/=l 
where !"2.(1) is the squared correlation between xii  and component 1. 
The principal component analysis is largely descriptive and only allows for 
identification of groups of countries with similar real exchange rate behavior. 
Formal hypothesis testing is as yet infeasible. In our analysis, we will focus on a 
comparison of individual correlations  r2(1)  with the  overall fit measured by 
/~I/ET= 1/~i, therefore. We will concentrate on those correlations exceeding the 
average fit. If a number of real exchange rates is highly, that is, above average, 
correlated with some principal component, we  identify this  component with 
that group of currencies. 
II. Data 
The  following 15  countries have  been  selected  for  the  principal component 
analysis:  Belgium (BE),  the  Netherlands (NL),  Germany (GE),  France (FR), 
the  United  Kingdom  (UK),  Czechoslovakia  (CS),  the  United  States  (US), 
Denmark (DK),  Sweden (SW),  Norway (NW),  Switzerland  (CH),  Italy  (IT), 
Finland  (SF),  Japan  (JP)  and  Canada  (CA).  Nominal  exchange  rates  and 
wholesale price indices have been taken from the League of Nations Monetary 
Review, for the sample period 1925:5 to 1937:12 (monthly data). 9 All variables 
have  been  transformed  to  logarithms.  Real  exchange  rates  against  the  US 
dollar were  constructed  as  x =e-p  +pUS, where  e  is  the  log nominal ex- 
change rate, p  is the log of the wholesale price index and pUS denotes the log 
of the US wholesale price index. 
In Table  1 means and standard deviations for bilateral real exchange rates 
against the US dollar (in logarithms) over the two sub periods 1925:5-1931:8 
and  1931:9-1937:12  are  presented. Also the  standard  deviations of bilateral 
real exchange rates relative to the pound are shown for these two periods. The 
table  offers the familiar picture that standard deviations surge in the second 
period. Although this holds true both for $ and £ real exchange rates, it is clear 
that the extent to which the variability changes across sub periods does depend 
on the choice of benchmark currency. 
Figure 1 contains a graphical presentation of real exchange rates against the 
dollar  for  each  country (solid  lines,  left  scale).  Additionally, the  difference 
between the domestic and US price level is shown (dotted lines, right scale). 
One message emerging from these graphs is that indeed groups of countries 
display  similar  real  exchange  rate  behavior  against  the  dollar.  One  easily 
defined group, for instance, is the so-called sterling-bloc (the United Kingdom, 
Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden,  Finland,  and  Canada). 1°  These  countries'  real 
exchange rates show remarkably similar peaks and troughs in the early thirties. 
Another  group  is  the  gold-bloc  (the  Netherlands,  Germany,  France,  Italy, 
Switzerland and Czechoslovakia), which also exhibit a common pattern in the 
thirties. 
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TABLE  1.  Summary statistics of real exchange rates (logarithms, relative to the US $ and the 
UK £) 
1925:5-1931:8  1931:9-1937:12 
Country  Mean  S.D.  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  S.D. 
($)  ($)  (£)  ($)  ($)  (£) 
NL  0.53  0.052  0.041  0.45  0.162  0.117 
GE  1.08  0.036  0.054  0.82  0.150  0.103 
BE  1.41  0.034  0.039  1.37  0.093  0.109 
FR  1.38  0.052  0.057  1.25  0.109  0.105 
UK  -  1.95  0.031  --  -  1.88  0.111  -- 
IT  1.35  0.057  0.056  1.24  0.144  0.148 
CH  1.24  0.024  0.026  1.10  0.122  0.141 
SW  0.91  0.033  0.025  1.01  0.101  0.082 
DK  0.87  0.031  0.020  0.97  0.091  0.086 
NW  0.81  0.035  0.039  0.93  0.102  0.083 
CS  1.24  0.044  0.043  1.07  0.101  0.144 
JP  0.21  0.036  0.029  0.61  0.123  0.144 
CA  -  0.45  0.018  0.038  -  0.38  0.037  0.088 
SF  3.29  0.044  0.055  3.35  0.084  0.096 
US  --  --  0.031  --  0.111 
HI. Partitioning real exchange rates 
The  principal  objective  of this  article  is  to  find empirical  regularities  in  the 
behavior of real  exchange  rates  between  1925  and  1937.  We  will investigate 
how  the  results  depend  on  the  choice  of  sample  period  by  comparing  the 
managed  gold  standard  period  (1925:5-1931:8)  with  the  interwar  managed 
floating  period  (1931:9-1937:2).  May  1925  is  chosen  as  the  starting  point 
because of Britain's return to gold at the pre-war parity in April. Correspond- 
ingly, the end point of the first period (August 1931) and the start of the second 
one  (September  1931)  is  set  at  the  moment  the  United  Kingdom suspended 
gold convertibility and left the gold standard. These choices are in line with the 
literature,  see for example Grilli and Kaminsky (1991) and Eichengreen (1990, 
1992). 
Obviously, the choice  of sub periods may influence the  results,  particularly 
so,  because  individual  countries  in  the  sample  entered  and  left  the  gold 
exchange  standard  at  different  times.  Moreover,  transitional  problems  in the 
switch from one regime to another could well have an additional effect on real 
exchange rate variability. In our discussion, we will pay explicit attention to this 
point. A  second caveat refers to problems related to the potential endogeneity 
of the choice of exchange  rate regime. Here, we take the exchange  rate regime 
as  given  when  interpreting  the  results  and  comparing  relative  real  exchange 
rate  variability  under  fixed  and  floating  exchange  rate  regimes.  In  reality,  it 
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may be  the  case  that  countries  resort  to  floating  rates  precisely  in  times  of 
crises or substantially divergent domestic macroeconomic policies, that is, when 
the variability of real shocks is high. Solving this issue is beyond the scope of 
the  current  paper. 11  For a  more detailed  overview of the  historic events  and 
actually  implemented country-specific  policies,  we  refer  to  Dam  (1982)  and 
Eichengreen (1990, 1992). 
Table 2 contains the principal component results for both sub periods. In the 
upper part of the table, the individual and cumulative explanatory power of the 
first, second, and so forth, component is given, corresponding to equation (13). 
For instance,  the  first principal component in the period  1925-1931  explains 
33% of total real exchange rate variation. This is computed as the ratio of the 
first  and  largest  eigenvalue (,~1) to the  sum of all  eigenvalues.  Similarly, the 
explanatory power of the second principal component in the first sub period is 
24%, which is equal to the ratio  of the second largest eigenvalue (a 2) to the 
sum of eigenvalues.  In the  first  sub period (1925-1931),  six principal compo- 
nents are needed to explain over 90% of the variation in real exchange rates, 
while  in the  second period (1931-1937)  four principal components are  suffi- 
cient. 12 
The remaining part of the table is divided in blocks, where each block has a 
country symbol in parentheses in the upper left hand comer, which indicates 
the  benchmark  currency.  The  first  block,  for  instance,  is  denoted  by  (US). 
Entries in this block give the squared correlation of principal components 1-6 
(rows)  with  each  country's  (columns)  real  exchange  rate  relative  to  the  US 
dollar (benchmark currency) in the first sub period. 
The entry in the first row for the column indicated by NL is 35, for example. 
That is, 35% of the total variation in the bilateral dollar-guilder real exchange 
rate  can  be  explained  by  the  first  principal  component alone.  Similarly,  the 
second row entry for Belgium is 42, implying that the second principal compo- 
nent explains  42%  of the variation  in the  bilateral  dollar-Belgian  franc  real 
exchange rate. In both cases, the explained amount of variation in the bilateral 
real exchange rate  under consideration exceeds the average fit of the compo- 
nent (33  and  24%,  respectively),  as  may be  inferred  from the bottom of the 
table. Therefore, these entries are printed in bold characters. Our discussion of 
the results will be focused on these above-average correlations. 
Column totals show the cumulated fit of the included principal components, 
corresponding to equation (14) with K =  6 and K =  4 respectively, for the two 
sub  periods.  Again  using  the  first  block  of the  table  where  the  US  is  the 
benchmark currency, it is seen that the amount of bilateral  real exchange rate 
variation  explained  by  the  first  six  principal  components  together,  differs 
considerably across countries.  Only 35%  of US-Canadian  real  exchange  rate 
variation  is  explained  by  the  total  of the  first  six  principal  components, for 
example,  even  though  these  same  six  components account  for  91%  of total 
bilateral exchange rate variation. The obvious implication is that real exchange 
rate variation between Canada and the US was minor (in a relative sense) over 
this period. 
To  save  space,  both  first  and  second  sub  period  results  are  presented  in 
Table 2, in the following way. In the first block where the US is the benchmark 
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country, all entries refer to the first sub period. In the second block where the 
Netherlands  is  the  benchmark  country,  entries  to  the  right  of the  (blank) 
column for the Netherlands itself are first period results. Entries to the left (for 
the  US  dollar-Dutch  guilder  exchange  rate),  however,  are  second  period 
TABLE 2.  Principal component results (1925:5-1931:8/1931:9-1937:12) 
(US)  US  NL  GE  BE  FR  UK  IT  CH  SW  DK  NW  CS  JP  CA  SF 
--  35  50  2  12  34  12  2  2  25  2  10  41  5  49 
--  40  28  42  69  0  65  7  7  3  2  24  1  0  7 
--  17  1  1  4  36  t  29  74  20  5  34  1  11  16 
--  0  5  15  2  0  16  0  2  6  23  18  16  6  19 
--  0  0  5  2  5  1  3  0  23  53  0  1  11  0 
--  3  3  13  5  10  1  12  1  2  0  7  26  2  2 








57  --  81  50  70  10  6  48  41  13  37  67  2  36  78 
35  --  5  5  3  57  9  28  36  42  23  4  39  34  9 
1  --  9  12  3  0  35  3  3  3  5  1  15  22  0 
1  --  1  8  2  0  26  0  1  2  7  10  8  0  7 
0  5  4  7  4  3  1  18  25  0  0  0  0 
0  16  13  20  13  12  9  9  2  14  33  4  5 








56  7  --  27  4  66  59  36  45  69  26  12  70  35  4 
32  8  --  0  39  10  21  12  5  8  12  0  7  31  7 
2  4  --  0  4  8  2  8  32  5  1  43  0  6  27 
0  34  --  29  16  2  7  5  1  0  5  9  1  1  17 
4  4  2  1  1  0  9  39  0  1  3  0 
22  21  9  5  16  4  5  2  27  18  6  20 








8  43  46  --  14  35  23  0  7  26  0  4  34  0  30 
6  25  24  --  41  25  21  31  11  17  15  0  14  37  5 
3  4  9  --  5  14  2  13  40  7  1  28  0  6  9 
36  23  14  --  2  12  48  21  20  26  47  56  32  22  48 
--  0  0  0  1  4  3  17  3  6  13  4 
--  0  0  1  2  5  3  8  0  2  6  1 








24  20  19  6  --  39  49  11  21  35  6  1  41  6  8 
4  59  62  16  --  52  0  71  48  46  52  29  39  65  44 
40  13  12  56  --  2  8  0  12  0  ()  13  2  10  2 
2  3  0  13  --  2  33  3  6  7  21  42  12  5  32 
0  0  1  3  1  11  4  4  7  4 
0  1  1  3  2  5  0  1  3  1 
Total  70  95  93  91  --  95  91  87  93  91  95  89  99  96  91 
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TABLE 2. (Continued) 








11  66  64  1  2  0  51  33  9  3  --  5  36  0  39 
57  3  1  50  53  1  25  54  4  0  --  17  0  2  3 
4  9  18  0  42  89  0  0  2  1  -  20  1  13  5 
4  10  1  22  0  2  22  6  2  14  --  0  0  10  0 
-  40  41  69  41 
-  9  17  !  3 
Total  76  88  84  73  97  92  98  93  17  18  --  91  95  95  91 
(CS) 
1  59  9  6  28  6  12  26  26  11  15  13  --  56  5  47 
2  12  79  80  35  1  54  24  15  83  75  80  --  13  25  15 
3  4  5  10  0  79  30  0  2  0  0  0  --  21  50  10 
4  1  3  0  20  0  0  32  19  0  0  0  --  1  10  0 
5  -  --  1  2  0 
6  -  --  2  4  4 
Total  76  96  96  83  86  96  82  62  94  90  93  --  94  96  76 
(JP) 
1  39  87  83  44  53  53  92  85  64  58  58  66  --  53  83 
2  12  6  4  2  14  4  2  9  4  6  5  17  --  1  2 
3  0  0  1  1  15  16  1  1  2  2  2  1  --  6  6 
4  21  4  10  52  16  20  0  5  26  21  28  13  --  7  1 
5  -  0  0 
6  -  18  4 








Total  56  96  93  62  82  84  96  91  84 
7  68  71  21  38  19  79  77  31  22  24  60  34  --  39 
20  25  22  1  15  38  0  6  41  54  47  21  6  --  8 
14  0  0  13  29  26  4  4  12  14  14  9  l  --  30 
15  3  0  27  0  1  13  4  0  l  0  0  39  --  12 
-  1 
--  l 
91  85  90  80  91 
--contbmed 
results.  The  corresponding  first  period  results  for  the  dollar-guilder  can 
already  be  found  in  the  first  block (US  benchmark  country).  In general,  for 
each  block (benchmark  country), entries to  the  right of the  blank benchmark 
country column refer to the first sub period, while entries to the left are for the 
second sub period. 
III.A.  The gold-exchange standard, May 1925 to August 1931 
The  formal start  of the  interwar gold-exchange standard was  generally set  in 
May (or April) 1925, because of Britain's return to the gold standard. However, Real exchange rates between the wars: C J M  Kool and K  G  Koedijk 
TABLE 2. (Continued) 
(US)  US  NL  GE  BE  FR  UK  IT  CH  SW  DK  NW  CS  JP  CA  SF 
(SF) 
1  7  60  59  0  7  0  67  61  14  1  5  32  61  19 
2  24  18  14  9  27  9  5  27  51  39  50  59  0  11 
3  11  10  17  4  62  81  1  2  5  3  2  1  5  31 
4  2  4  0  49  0  0  17  4  1  1  2  0  29  0 
5  --  --  -- 





aExplanatory  power  of principal  components  (percentage  explained  real  exchange  rate 
variation) 
Component:  1  2  3  4  5  6  Cumulated 
1925--31  33  24  11  11  7  5  91 
1931--37  32  26  12  10  --  --  91 
bEntries are squared correlations between principal components and real exchange rates. 
Individual components are indexed by row number, real exchange rates defined relative to a 
benchmark currency are indexed by columns. The benchmark currency is indicated between 
parentheses in the upper left corner of each part of the table. Correlations for 1925:5-1931:8 
are in the upper right triangle, while correlations for 1931:9-1937:12  are in the lower left 
triangle. 
it  is  well-known  that  many  countries  took  much  longer  to  stabilize  their 
economies and  to fix their currencies  in terms  of gold again.  In particular,  of 
the  countries  in  our  sample,  France,  Italy,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Norway  and 
Japan  had  floating  nominal  exchange  rates  for  some  time  after  May  1925 
before joining the gold standard. Japan was the last one of this group in 1930. 
In  that  sense,  the  first  sub  period  in  our  analysis  provides  an  interesting 
opportunity to compare two sources of real exchange rate changes. On the one 
hand, real exchange rate changes originating from diverging price levels across 
countries with fixed exchange rates, and on the other hand, real exchange rate 
changes  originating  from the  countries  that  remained  on  (managed)  floating 
exchange rates temporarily. 
The first principal component in the period 1925-1931  explains 33%  of the 
total  variation  in  real  exchange  rates,  and  is  predominantly  associated  with 
movements  in  the  real  exchange  rates  of all  countries,  except  Belgium  and 
France,  relative to  Finland  and  Germany. This can be  seen by checking  that 
the entries  at  the  first row under the  column SF (Finland)  are  mostly printed 
bold.  The  explanatory  power  of  the  first  component  to  explain  bilateral 
movements in real exchange rates relative to the Finnish markka often exceeds 
50%. The same, though to a  lesser degree, is true for Germany. 
The second principal component explains 24% and mainly is a French-Italian 
phenomenon.  Bilateral  exchange  rate  movements against  the  French franc or 
Italian  lira are generally highly correlated with this component. The third and 
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fourth component both  explain  about  11%  of exchange  rate  variation.  The 
third  component  shows  strong  correlation  with  exchange  rate  movements 
between Canada and the US on the one hand, and Sweden and Czechoslovakia 
on the other. It is,  however, also explaining movements between the US and 
Canada  and  a  large  group  of countries,  to  wit,  the  Netherlands,  the  UK, 
Switzerland, Denmark and Finland, and between Sweden and Czechoslovakia 
and another group, Germany, Belgium, Italy,  Switzerland, Denmark, Norway 
and Japan. The fourth component is a pure Belgian phenomenon. 
The  fifth  component,  explaining  7%  is  representing  movements  against 
Norway and Denmark. Finally, the sixth component is a  mix, again. Predomi- 
nantly, it explains movements in the Japanese yen relative to the Netherlands, 
Germany, Belgium, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the US and Canada. 
However, the sixth component is also significantly correlated with movements 
in the Dutch guilder and German mark relative to Belgium, France, the UK, 
Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark and Czechoslovakia. 
The  above  split-up  of  the  total  amount  of  exchange  rate  variation  in 
independent factors and the identification of specific countries with each factor 
lead to the following conclusions. The first principal component is primarily a 
Finnish-German  phenomenon. As  both  countries  have  been  on  the  gold 
standard over the whole sample, this suggests that the principal source of real 
exchange rate variation in the period 1925-1931, was due to price divergences 
across countries. A  similar argument holds for the third component where the 
US, Canada, Sweden and Czechoslovakia play a  dominant role. The US and 
Sweden were on the gold standard  from the beginning of the sample, while 
Canada and Czechoslovakia followed soon. 
For the other four principal components identified, a  different story holds: 
the real exchange rate variation identified in prinicpal components 2, 4, 5, and 
6  apparently  is  due  more  to  the  adjustment  of individual countries  under 
floating nominal exchange rates. 
Overall, then, about half of the identified real exchange rate variation in the 
period 1925-1931  may be assigned to nominal exchange rate  adjustment and 
half of it to cross-country price level divergences. 
III.B. Managed floating,  September 1931 to December 1937 
The start of the second sub period is September 1931, when the UK was driven 
off the  gold standard.  The  response of other countries was  mixed. For this 
period, a grouping of countries in a 'sterling bloc' and a  'gold bloc' (according 
to the prevailing exchange rate regime) is fairly standard in the literature. Dam 
(1982,  p.  48)  for example, states  that  'the world was  effectively divided into 
monetary blocs. European countries adhering to the gold standard had formed 
a  "gold bloc" upon the collapse of the  1933  World Economic Conference. ~3 
Although the governments of France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
and Switzerland agreed that their central banks should cooperate to maintain 
the existing gold parities, the gold bloc was little more than a name for those 
European  countries  remaining  on  gold.  A  second  regional  group  was  the 
sterling  area,  whose  members  tended  to  float  with  sterling.'  According  to 
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Nurkse  (1944,  p.  47)  the  sterling  area  comprised 'in  the  first  instance  the 
British  Commonwealth of Nations, with the important exception of Canada, 
whose currency took a middle course between the pound and the US dollar .... 
Others joined it later: the Scandinavian countries, for example, in 1933 ....  In 
addition, there were several countries, including Japan  and Argentina, which 
kept their official exchange rate fixed in sterling, but which were not generally 
regarded as members of the sterling bloc.  '14 
In this paper, we take the European gold-bloc to consist of France, Switzer- 
land,  the  Netherlands,  and  Belgium. The  US  is  not  included in  this  group 
although they remained on gold most of this period. The US suspended the 
gold standard  in  April  1933  and  after  a  devaluation  and  a  short  period of 
managed  floating  again  stabilized  the  dollar  against  gold in  January  1934. 
However, Dam (1982, p. 48) argues that 'the gold bloc countries were substan- 
tially overvalued relative not just to sterling area currencies but to the dollar as 
well'. Therefore, the US gold standard is assumed to differ from the European 
gold bloc. Czechoslovakia and Italy originally belonged to the European gold 
bloc as well, but switched to a group of countries, including Germany, that used 
strict exchange controls to fix their exchange rate. They thus take an intermedi- 
ate  position.  The  sterling-bloc is  assumed  to  consist  of the  UK,  Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and  Finland.  Because  Japan  informally fixed to  the  pound 
sterling it is considered a potential sterling bloc member as well. Canada tried 
to steer a course between the UK (within the Commonwealth) and the US, its 
main trading partner. Thus, Canada is thought to have a position between the 
sterling area on the one hand and the US gold standard on the other. 
The results of the principal components analysis for this period are in the 
lower left triangle in Table 2. The first principal component explains 43%  of 
total real exchange rate variation and is primarly correlated with real exchange 
rate  movements of the  US,  Canada  and  Japan  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia on the other. In 
addition, this first component strongly correlates with movements between the 
sterling bloc (the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland), and Japan, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Italy. 
The  second component, explaining 26%,  predominantly explains exchange 
rate  movements between the sterling bloc (excluding Finland) plus Germany 
and  the  Netherlands  on the  one hand,  and  the  gold-bloc countries  the  US 
(+ Canada),  France,  Italy,  Switzerland,  Belgium and  Czechoslovakia on  the 
other. 
The  third  component picks up  the  movement of the  UK  relative  to  the 
Scandinavian  sterling-bloc  countries.  This  reflects  a  round  of  competitive 
devaluations during the transition period 1931-1933 between the suspension of 
gold in the UK and the formal establishment of the sterling-bloc in  1933.  In 
this  period,  the  Scandinavian  countries,  at  different  times  and  speed,  first 
appreciated due to the devaluation of sterling and then devalued themselves to 
fix  new  sterling  exchange  rates  at  lower  levels  than  those  under  the  gold 
standard.  The  third  component is  also  correlated  with  the  exchange  rate 
movement of France against Belgium, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia within 
the  gold-bloc. The  fourth component is  largely a  Belgian phenomenon and 
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explains about 10%.  It also captures exchange rate  movements against Japan 
and Italy. 
Overall,  the results of our analysis  lead to  a  grouping of countries on the 
basis of real exchange rate variation that is coinciding with a  grouping on the 
basis of nominal exchange rate  regime. The sterling-bloc, the European gold- 
bloc and the US-Canada gold-bloc  ~5 can clearly be distinguished in our results. 
Real  exchange  rate  variation  between  groups  of  countries  with  different 
nominal exchange rate regimes (components 1 and 2) appear to be dominating 
real exchange rate variation within blocs (components 3  and 4, and partly 2). 
Moreover, a considerable part of the within bloc variation is due to competitive 
devaluations within the sterling bloc, which may be  interpreted as  a  form of 
managed  nominal  floating.  The  results  support  earlier  evidence,  that  real 
exchange rate  variation to  a  large  extent depends on the  nominal exchange 
rate regime)  6 
IV. Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we have constructed a new data set of real exchange rates for 15 
countries  over  the  period  May  1925  to  December  1937,  covering both  the 
interwar gold-exchange period and managed float period. We have applied a 
modified principal component technique to analyze patterns in real exchange 
rate behavior under different nominal exchange rate regimes. 
The modification of the principal components technique consists of a linear 
transformation such that the choice of an arbitrary benchmark currency does 
not affect the results. This allows for a symmetric treatment of all bilateral real 
exchange  rates,  and  improves  on  most  applied  work  that  focuses  on  real 
exchange rates expressed in either US dollars or UK pounds only. 
The evidence for the period May 1925-August 1931 suggests that about half 
of the total real exchange rate variation in that period derives from price level 
divergences, while the other half originates from countries on floating nominal 
exchange rates during part of the period to stabilize their economies. It shows 
that cross-country price level differences can be important for real  exchange 
rates.  No evidence is  found, though, of dominant real  exchange rate  move- 
ments due  to  the  often claimed overvaluation of the  British  pound in  that 
period. 
The second period results (September 1931-December 1937)  show that an 
ordering of countries on the basis of real exchange rate movements is approxi- 
mately coinciding with an ordering on the basis of countries' nominal exchange 
rate regime. The two most dominant principal components are associated with 
real exchange rate movements between the European gold-bloc countries, the 
US and Canada, and the Sterling bloc. Real exchange rate  movements within 
blocs appear of secondary importance only. Moreover, part of the within bloc 
variation may also be interpreted as being due to managed nominal exchange 
rate variability (competitive devaluations). 
Because the principal components analysis allows for a symmetric treatment 
of all bilateral  exchange rates, we are  able to go beyond earlier evidence by, 
among others, Eichengreen (1988, 1990,  1992)  that the nominal exchange rate 
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regime  has  heavily  influenced  real  exchange  rate  behavior  in  the  interwar 
period.  We  are  able  to  identify a  few common factors  behind real exchange 
rate variability that correspond closely to a standard grouping of countries with 
similar exchange rate policies. Floating nominal exchange rates between these 
groups (blocs) appear to be the largest source of real exchange rate movements 
in the 1930s. 
Our  evidence  throws  doubt  on  the  hypothesis  put  forward  by  Grilli  and 
Kaminsky (1991)  that  the  degree  of correspondence  between  real  exchange 
rate variability and nominal exchange rate regime depends on random sample- 
specific events. Our finding that nominal and real exchange rate variability  are 
closely linked is consistent both with Mussa's argument based on sticky goods 
prices in a Dornbusch-type exchange rate model and with models of destabiliz- 
ing  speculation.  Also,  it  may  be  possible  that  the  choice  of exchange  rate 
regime  itself is  endogenous  and  is  determined  by  the  relative  frequency  of 
cross-country  shocks,  so  that  reverse  causality  leads  to  our findings. We  are 
unable  to  solve  this  issue  satisfactorily.  However,  since  Eichengreen  (1993) 
concludes that monocausal explanations are unlikely to provide a full account 
of the endogeneity of exchange rate regimes, some confidence may be attached 
to  the  underlying assumption here  that  the  exchange  rate  regime is  at least 
weakly exogenous to real exchange rate shocks. 
Notes 
1.  For  recent  evidence on  the  mean reversion of real  exchange  rates  under the  gold 
standard and the recent float, we refer to Diebold et al. (1991), and Lothian and Taylor 
(1996).  Fisher (1934)  contains early work on this issue. 
2.  We refer to de Grauwe et al. (1985)  for a comparison of real exchange rate variability 
under floating exchange rates in the 1920s and 1970s. 
3.  See Koedijk and Schotman (1989)  and Koedijk and Kool (1992)  for application of this 
technique  in  the  fields  of  exchange  rates  and  interest  and  inflation  differentials, 
respectively. 
4.  See  Stock and Watson (1988)  for the  connection between principal components and 
cointegration analysis. 
5.  B  is unique apart from sign, if all elements of A  are  different, which we henceforth 
assume. 
6.  For notational convenience, the subscript on  ~ and  I  will be suppressed when there 
can be no confusion about the appropriate dimensions. 
7.  In a maximum likelihood derivation of the principal components, 0  has the interpreta- 
tion of a variance. The choice of 0 does not affect the factor loadings; it only serves as 
a scalar scaling parameter for all time series of principal components. 
8.  The alternative solution is  ~ = (1 + (n +  1)  1/2)/n. Which of the two solutions for c~ 
is chosen is irrelevant, since the principal components depend on Q, not QI/2. 
9.  Tinbergen (1934)  has served as an additional data source. 
10.  The  rise  in  real  exchange  rate  variation  (relative  to  the  £)  for  countries  in  the 
sterling-bloc (see Table 1), is completely due to the transition in the years 1931-1933 
from the gold standard to a sterling-link. This illustrates the care with which summary 
statistics should be interpreted. 
11.  Eichengreen (1993)  elaborates on this issue. 
12.  Anderson (1984)  suggests to ignore the last  p  -m  principal components (where p  is 
the  number of variables  included),  if  their  cumulative explanatory  power  is  small 
relative  to  the  overall variance. We  follow this  suggestion, using a  10%  threshold. 
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CoincidentaUy,  in  our  application  it  implies  that  no  principal  components  with  an 
individual explanatory power of at least 5% are left out of the analysis. 
13.  The  World  Economic  Conference  refers  to  the  negotiations  about  a  stabilization 
arrangement among the United States, Britain, and the countries that had remained on 
the gold standard after September 1931. 
14.  See  Dam  (1982),  Nurkse  (1944),  and  Eichengreen  (1988,  1990,  1992)  for  a  more 
detailed account of this period. 
15.  A~ a side result, our analysis shows that Canada kept much closer to the US than to the 
UK in  the  second period.  According to Table  2,  the  first  four components together 
explain  84% of Canada's real  exchange rate variability relative to the pound, but only 
56% of variability relative to the US dollar. 
16.  Eichengreen  and  Irwin  (1993)  provide  an  interesting  link  between  trade  blocs  and 
currency blocs in the  1930s.  In general,  currency blocs appear to have had  a  positive 
effect  of  intra-bloc  trade  relative  to  trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  This  raises 
important questions with respect to the relation and causality between trade flows and 
real exchange rates. These are left for future research,  however. 
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